This paper focuses on a class of continuous-time controlled Markov chains with timeinconsistent and distribution-dependent cost functional (in some appropriate sense). A new definition of time-inconsistent distribution-dependent equilibrium in closed-loop sense is given and its existence and uniqueness have been established. Because of the time-inconsistency, it is proved that the equilibrium is locally optimal in an appropriate sense. Moreover, it has been shown that our problem is essentially equivalent to an infinite-player mean-field game with time-inconsistent cost.
Introduction
An alternative idea to deal with distribution-dependence can be paralleled from the recent developments in the mean-field game theory (see [16, 17, 14, 15, 10, 11, 12, 13] ). In a mean-field game problem, one considers a backward Hamilton-Jacobi equation coupled with a forward transport equation on the space of probability measures. Using the fixed-point theory, one can derive a mean-field equilibrium, which is essentially a Nash equilibrium point. Applying the similar idea to the control problem with time-consistent and distributiondependent cost functional, the first step is to solve a classical HJ equation which is concluded from the classical optimal control of system given a guiding (fixed) process ρ(·) in the cost functional. A feedback control can be determined if the HJ equation is "regular enough". Then the second step is to verify that the guiding process ρ(·) coincides with the distribution law of the dynamics using the feedback control. If the two-step verification is fulfilled, the feedback control is called a mean-field equilibrium. One can see that the mean-field equilibrium is essentially a fixed point using such definition. However we have to mention that the equilibrium is not an optimal strategy in general even for the time-consistent cases.
In this paper, we considered continuous-time and finite-state controlled Markov chains with time-inconsistent distribution-dependent cost functional using a similar idea to meanfield game theory. We present a new definition for time-inconsistent mean-field equilibrium, which verifies a local optimality in some appropriate sense. Then we can prove the existence and uniqueness of the time-inconsistent mean-field equilibrium under some appropriate conditions. Moreover, we show that the time-inconsistent mean-field equilibrium found is equivalent to an equilibrium for a mean-field game of infinite-many equivalent players with time-inconsistent cost functional. Previous works on time-inconsistent distributiondependent systems include [19, 22, 28] . To the best of our knowledge, most of the papers are concerned with a special class of linear stochastic differential equations with quadratic costs. There are few papers concerned with the theory on continuous-time controlled Markov chains with time-inconsistent and distribution-dependent cost. The paper aims to fill this gap.
The paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some notation together with certain preliminary results for controlled Markov Chain. Section 3 introduces the timeinconsistent mean-field equilibrium and prove the existence and uniqueness. Section 4 shows that our problem is equivalent to an infinite-player mean-field game with time-inconsistent cost. Finally some concluding remarks are made in Section 5.
Preliminaries

Notation
Let M = {1, · · · , m} and T = [0, T ]. Denote by M be the set of all possible functions defined on M equipped with the sup-norm · M . Set
Let P be the collection of all probability measures on M equipped with metric d(·, ·) defined by
Denote by C([0, T ], P) be the set of all continuous P-valued curves on T. Let U be the space of actions equipped with the metric |·, ·| U and v 0 be a fixed element in U. Let U be the set of all possible maps from M to U equipped with the following metric
Controlled Markov Chain
In this paper, we consider a finite-state controlled Markov chain with generator
where the state space is M and the action space is U.
To make sure Q v t is a generator of a Markov chain, we define the admissible action set for state i being
is a generator in the sense that q v t (i, j) ≥ 0 if j = i and m j=1 q v t (i, j) = 0. Throughout the paper, we assume that U t (i) is not empty and measurable under the topology of U induced by the metric |·, ·| U .
Let the set of all admissible strategies on time-interval [t 0 , T ] be
We can define a map φ t :
Given any π ∈ L 1 ([0, T ], U), we write µ t 0 ,ρ,π t as the solution of (2.1) at time t with initial data ρ at time t 0 under the strategy π. If the initial data ρ = δ x , i.e., the Dirac measure concentrated on the point x, we write µ t 0 ,x,π t = µ t 0 ,δx,π t . Especially the initial time t 0 will be omitted if t 0 = 0. Now we pose the following assumptions to guarantee the regularity of the dynamic (2.1).
Assumption (A)
(A1) The admissible action set U · is right continuous with left limits. That is,
.
(A3) There exists constants K 1 , κ 1 > 0 such that for any t ∈ [0, T ] and i, j ∈ M,
Remark 2.1. Note that q v t (i, j) is right continuous with left limit w.r.t. t from (A1) and (A2) and q v t (i, j) is Lipschitz with respect to v from (A3). Thus the existence and uniqueness of the solution of (2.1) given any π ∈ L 1 ([0, T ], U) holds directly. Note that such assumptions are stronger than necessary for the existence and uniqueness of the solution. The reason we assume such assumption is to conclude the following proposition to be used for the control problem.
To proceed, we present some regularity results about (2.1) first. The proof of which can be found in [26] (Page 19, Theorem 2.5).
The unique solution of (2.1) is µ ρ,π t = ρP π 0,t , i.e., for each j ∈ M,
Because of the Lipschitz-dependence of the transition rate (which depends on the strategies), the following lemma indicates that the solution of dynamic (2.1) is Lipschitz-dependent on the strategies as well.
Lemma 2.4. Under Assumption (A), given any two admissible strategies π, π ′ ∈ L 1 ([0, T ], U) and ρ, γ ∈ P, it follows that
Proof. Noting that m j=1 p π t (i, j) = 1, simple calculation yields
In this section, we introduce the control problem that we are interested in and give the definition of time-inconsistent equilibrium. Moreover, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the time-inconsistent mean-field equilibrium under some general conditions. This section is divided into several subsections.
Definition of Time-inconsistent Mean-field Equilibrium
In this subsection, we mainly introduce the definition of time-inconsistent mean-field equilibrium for our control problem. We begin by defining the time-inconsistent distribution dependent cost functional first. Let the running cost and terminal cost rates be maps defined as
In the paper, we are concerned with the following distribution-dependent time-inconsistent cost functional with non-exponential discounting factor τ ,
and the corresponding value functional
Here the J and V are distribution-dependent because f and g depends on the distribution term as well. If f and g are distribution-independent, such problem reduces to a classical time-inconsistent control problem.
As alluded to in the introduction, it is impossible to find a optimal strategy because of the time-inconsistency. Thus we look for the time-inconsistent distribution-dependent equilibrium. The definition is given as follows.
A pair (ρ, π) ∈ P × D([0, T ], U) is called a time-inconsistent equilibrium for our distributiondependent cost if the following local-optimality holds,
where the perturbed strategy
Remark 3.2. We note the following facts.
(1) Along the solution curve µ ρ,π T , we have
(2) From the definition of a time-inconsistent equilibrium (ρ, π), we can see that there are two steps to verify.
(a) Find the unique solution µ ρ,π T of the dynamic (2.1) using (ρ, π). (b) Using ν T = µ ρ,π T as a priori curve, find the distribution-independent time-inconsistent equilibrium strategy which verifies the local-optimality.
If such two-step recursion is fulfilled, one can see that (ρ, π) is a time-inconsistent meanfield equilibrium. Thus we will adopt the fixed-point theory to prove the existence and uniqueness of the time-inconsistent distribution-dependent equilibrium.
To proceed, we first present the following example to avoid some possible confusions. Example 3.3. Suppose that the terminal cost in (3.1) is given by
is the variance of the distribution µ T . In this case, if we let
is the variance of the distribution µ T as well. Thus g andg give the same terminal functional in V. While in the process of deriving the fixed-point, the terminal conditions in the Hamilton-Jacobi equation will be different. As a consequence, the timeinconsistent equilibrium will be different as well. Therefore it is natural to question which of those is the correct one to use. In fact, in Section 4, we introduce a time-inconsistent mean-field game with infinite-many equivalent players. We can clearly identify the correct forms of f and g from the problem itself. Thus, generally speaking, the forms of f or g depend on the model used.
Distribution-independent Equilibrium with a Priori ν T
In this subsection, we derive the process to find a (classical) time-inconsistent equilibrium if ν T in the cost functional is given a priori. This is the step (b) from Remark 3.2. Essentially, we are finding a time-inconsistent equilibrium of which the idea is taken from [27] . The main effort is to find a time-inconsistent HJ equation derived from an N-player game. While in our paper, we present the HJ equation and verify the required local-optimality directly. Further details regarding the derivation of of the time-inconsistent HJ equation can be found in [27] . We first present some assumptions.
Given u ∈ U, define an operator Q u t : M → M by
Assumption (B)
(B1) There existsf τ,t : M × P → R + and Ψ t :
(B3) There exists a map ψ t : M → U such that for any h ∈ M,
Moreover, For any h, h ′ ∈ M, 
β t (j) = 0.
One can easily see that
This proves that λv + (1 − λ)v ′ ∈ U t (i), for any λ ∈ [0, 1], i.e., U t (i) is a convex subset. It can also be seen that U t (i) is closed. Thus U t (i) is a closed subinterval of [−1, 1], and as a result,
is well-defined by the strong convexity. Moreover, if β t (i) is right-continuous with respect to t, (3.4) holds directly. Now we are ready to introduce the time-inconsistent HJ equation for our problem. Given ν T ∈ C([0, T ], P), consider the following time-inconsistent Hamilton-Jacobi equation,
where p π t 0 ,t 1 (j) is defined in (2.3) . It is easy to see that (3.5) is equivalent to
In view of the form of the HJ equation, formally we can conclude that the solution
Note that it is not required Θ t,t (i) being continuous in t, or even measurable. Let us look at the following example. Obviously Θ τ,t is continuous with respect t for each fixed τ . While Θ t,t = I(t ∈ T 1 ) is not a measurable function.
Therefore, to guarantee the regularity of Θ t,t , we assume the following conditions hold. Assumption (C)f τ,t (i), g τ (i) are right continuous with left limit with respect to τ for each (t, i) ∈ T × M.
With such an assumption, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.7. Under Assumptions (A), (B), (C), given any ν T ∈ C([0, T ], P), there exists a solution pair (Θ, π) ∈ M [0, T ] 2 ×D([0, T ], U) for (3.5) with Θ t,t (i) is right-continuous with left-limit for each i ∈ M. As a consequence,
Proof. The proof is based on the fixed-point theory. Since ν T is given a priori, we omit ν T in the proof. Given two θ, θ ′ ∈ D([0, T ], M), let (Θ, π), (Θ ′ , π ′ ) be the solutions of
for any i ∈ M,
and we have the contraction inequality
Now we show that if θ ∈ D([0, T ], M), Θ t,t is also right continuous with left limit. Then we note that
Using Assumption (C) and letting ε → 0 + ,
This proves that Θ t,t is right continuous with respect to t. Similarly, Θ t,t has a left limit with respect to t. Now we are ready to prove the existence and uniqueness of the solution by adopting the fixed point theory. Given θ (1) ∈ D([0, T ], M), let Θ (1) be the solution of (3.5). Let θ (2) t (i) = Θ (1) t (i) for each (t, i). By our claim, we know that θ (2) ∈ D([0, T ], M). Then let Θ (2) be the solution of (3.5) using θ (2) . Recursively repeating such process, one can get a sequence of functions {(θ (n) , Θ (n) }. By (3.7), we have 
Proof. By Assumption (B2) and the representation of Θ in (3.6), (3.8) holds with some uniform constant κ 2 independent of the choice of ν T .
Next, we prove that the strategy from (3.5) verifies the local-optimality (3.3).
Theorem 3.9. Under Assumptions (A), (B), (C), given a tuple (ν T , Θ, π), where (Θ, π) solves (3.5) with given priori ν T , it follows that
with π ε t = u for any ε > 0. Proof. Note that
Since π ε and π are right-continuous, it follows that
Since π ε , π are right-continuous and by Assumption (A),
As a result, by (3.9), (3.10) and the definition of
The proof is complete.
Time-inconsistent Distribution-dependent Equilibrium
In this section, we use the following two-step recursion to prove the existence and uniqueness of the time-inconsistent mean-field equilibrium.
Step-1: Given a ν
T ∈ C([0, T ], P) with initial ν (1) 0 = ρ, let (Θ (1) , π (1) ) be the solution pair of (3.5).
Step-2: Using the strategy π (1) , let ν
T be the solution of the dynamic equation (2.1) with initial ν T , Θ (n) , π (n) ). Now we aim to prove such a sequence is convergent in an appropriate sense. We need the following lemma. and (Θ,π) be the solutions of (3.5) respectively. Then there exists a constant κ 3 > 0 such that
for some appropriate f and g. Here every player is assumed to make their decisions according to the same time-inconsistent cost functional. Because of the time-inconsistency, it is impossible to find the equilibrium strategy which verifies (4.1). Thus for such a game, we aim to find a time-inconsistent N-player strategy in the following sense.
Definition 4.1. An N-player strategy π N = π 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ π N ∈ D N ([0, T ], U) is called a time-inconsistent equilibrium if lim inf
for any k ∈ N and π ε ∈ D([t, t + ε), U).
The N-player equilibrium can be understood in the following way. Consider a player ℓ, if it is assumed that the strategies of the other players are known from the equilibrium, the strategy of player ℓ finds in the time-inconsistent control problem, coincides with player ℓ's strategy determined in the equilibrium. The above equilibrium essentially indicates that with all the strategies of the other players fixed, the ℓ-player's strategy is locally optimal.
Let N → ∞, i.e., the number of the players tends to infinity, and suppose that ρ N,−k 0 → γ for any k. It can be seen that all the players are equivalent in such game. Thus we can conclude that every player should obey the same strategy π. By the law of large numbers, ρ N,−k T converges to the curve µ γ,π T determined by dµ t dt = µ t Q πt t with µ 0 = γ.
In this case the equilibrium is fully determined by (γ, π) since every player is equivalent in such time-inconsistent mean-field game. It is not difficult to see that (γ, π) coincides with that in Definition 3.1. In this sense, we can call the equilibrium defined in Definition 3.1 a time-inconsistent mean-field equilibrium too.
